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Abstract 
Today, it is very common for employees to need to work when outside of the office.  For 
various reasons, it’s important that they be able to work anytime and anywhere.  However, this 
raises security concerns about how this is accomplished.  There are many options, such as virtual 
private networks (VPNs) and remote desktop solutions, but each comes with its own risks.  A 
newer option is the MobiKEY from Route1, which allows users to connect to their work 
resources from anywhere.   
 Route1 touts the MobiKEY, powered by MobiNET, as a much more secure method of 
remote access.  How does it stack up against other solutions?  This paper examines the 
advantages of MobiKEY from a security perspective as contrasted with other options.  The 
author performed a risk assessment of the device based upon guidelines from the National 
Institute of Technology (NIST) and obtained a MobiKEY from Route1 for the purposes of 
testing.  This paper documents those findings.   
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
1.1 Statement of Problem 
In today’s world, it is very common for employees to need remote access to their work 
computer and network resources while outside of the office.  Employees often need the ability to 
work wherever and whenever they want.  However, remote access inherently creates some 
security risks.  Employees may carry a laptop that contains private or proprietary information.  If 
this equipment is lost or stolen, then it creates a security breach for the organization.  Employees 
may also connect back to their organization’s internal network via a virtual private network 
(VPN) connection or via some other remote desktop solution such as GoToMyPC or Laplink 
Everywhere.  A newer option is MobiKEY, a portable validation device from Route1, which 
allows users to remotely access their work computer from any other computer that has a USB 
port utilizing their TruOFFICE service.   
It is important for organizations and their members to recognize the risks posed by any 
form of remote access.  There usually is a legitimate business need to have remote access, 
whether this involves telecommuting from a home office or doing work while traveling for 
business.  At the same time, it’s important to have some mechanisms in place in order to protect 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of resources.  It’s important to strive to achieve a 
balance between reasonable access to resources while protecting against threats (Whitman and 
Mattord, 2005).  The question is how to do this most effectively while allowing employees to 
have remote access. It is important to keep this in mind while evaluating different options for 
remote access, whether it using a VPN, remote desktop, or MobiKEY.   
 Route1 positions MobiKEY and the TruOFFICE service in the marketplace as an option 
to securely access digital resources from anywhere at any time.  After an initial setup procedure 
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on the work computer, remote connections are possible from any computer with an Internet 
connection and a USB port.  The device uses no drivers and leaves no trace of the session on the 
computer used for remote access, providing security and simplicity.  This seems like a great 
solution, but the question remains as to how it stacks up against other remote access solutions 
from a security standpoint.  
1.2 Thesis Statement 
When evaluating remote access solutions, security must be a primary concern.  Any time 
that resources are accessed or taken out of an organization’s trusted network, there is a 
possibility that these resources may be compromised.  It’s important to utilize solutions that can 
effectively minimize the risk of this occurring.  This involves examining the strength of 
authentication and encryption provided by a solution, as well as investigating any vulnerabilities 
that may exist within the solution.  For purposes of this study, the author focused on the 
MobiKEY solution offered by Route1 in order to evaluate the level of security provided.  The 
key question of this study is to examine the security advantages of using MobiKEY over other 
remote access applications, such as virtual private networks and other remote desktop solutions.   
1.3 Statement of Goals and Objectives 
The goal of this project was to investigate the level of security offered by the MobiKEY 
product from Route1 in comparison with other solutions currently available, such as VPN 
solutions and remote desktop products such as GoToMyPC and Laplink Everywhere.   
1.4 Work Plans, Methods and Procedures 
This project examined the security advantages of using MobiKEY for remote access 
utilizing the risk assessment portion of the risk management methodology.  As defined by the 
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National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), there are nine steps to the risk 
assessment process (Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa, 2002).  These steps are: 
1. System Characterization 
2. Threat Identification 
3. Vulnerability Identification 
4. Control Analysis 
5. Likelihood Determination 
6. Impact Analysis 
7. Risk Determination 
8. Control Recommendations 
9. Results Documentation 
 
The author employed these steps to perform an analysis of the risks involved with 
MobiKEY as a remote access solution.  The analysis was conducted as an individual user, rather 
than testing the solution in a business environment.  The author did not have access to any testing 
environment where this could be validated for an entire organization, although the results can be 
utilized by any organization to assist in their own research of the security advantages of the 
product.   
 Additionally, the author obtained a MobiKEY device from Route1 directly, for the 
purposes of first hand testing and evaluation of the security of the solution.  While the review of 
security literature and product documentation gave a good basis for the analysis, actual use of the 
product was necessary in order to perform comprehensive testing.   
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Chapter 2 – Review of Literature and Research 
2.1 Value of Information 
 To begin, it’s important to understand why security is such an important issue when 
dealing with remote access.  Information security is designed to protect data by addressing three 
elements: confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007).  These elements 
make up what is commonly referred to as the C.I.A. Triangle, and they are the characteristics that 
provide information with its value.  Confidentiality ensures that information is only accessed by 
those who have permission to do so.  The goal of maintaining confidentiality is to make certain 
that no unauthorized parties are able to obtain such data.  Integrity of information means that it is 
available in its original form and has not been altered by any unauthorized parties.  Availability 
is important so that information can be accessed when needed.  Failure to ensure availability may 
create costly downtime for an organization.  Protecting all three of these characteristics of data is 
crucial to protecting its value.   
Additionally, there are other characteristics of information that are also important; these 
include accuracy, authenticity, utility, and possession (Whitman & Mattord, 2005).  Accuracy of 
information means that there are no errors in the information and that it’s what the end user 
expects.  If the information’s accuracy is in doubt, then the information’s value is diminished.  
Authenticity means that information is in its original form and is what it appears to be. Utility 
means that information has value to the user and can be used for a specific purpose.  Possession 
means that a user has access to and control over information in order to use it effectively.  These 
characteristics are very important when dealing with information in any context.  However, when 
considering these elements within the context of remote access, their importance is even more 
apparent. Information that is accessed and/or transmitted remotely may be susceptible to 
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intercept or attacks that compromise one or more of the above characteristics, thus diminishing 
or destroying its value.  Taking adequate steps to address the security of remote access is critical 
for these reasons.  
2.2 Encryption 
 In order to protect information and ensure its value, data should be encrypted.  
Encryption is performed using cryptography, which involves hiding the true content of 
information.  According to Ciampa, cryptography provides for information security in five ways:  
providing confidentiality so that only authorized users can view it; providing authentication so 
that the sender can be verified as genuine and trusted; providing integrity so that the receiver can 
verify that information has not been altered; offering nonrepudiation, so that no one can deny 
that the information has been sent or received; and offering access control so that the availability 
of information can be restricted (Ciampa, 2005).  It’s critical to utilize encryption for information 
that will be accessed remotely, particularly while in transport.  This requires that the other party 
be able to decrypt the message and determine its contents.   
2.2.1 Symmetric Encryption 
 There are two primary categories of encryption.  The first is symmetric encryption, which 
is also known as private key encryption.  In symmetric encryption, the same key is used both to 
encrypt and decrypt a message.  The most commonly used form of symmetric encryption today 
is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), which was adopted by United States National 
Institute of Technology (NIST) in 2000 and published as Federal Information Publishing (FIP) 
Standards Publication 197 in 2001.  AES was adopted after the previous forms of symmetric 
encryption, Data Encryption Standard (DES) and Triple DES (3DES), proved to be too weak for 
top-secret communications and their keys proven too easy to break  (Whitman & Mattord, 2005).   
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 AES uses a block size of 128-bits of data, and can utilize key sizes of 128, 192, or 256 
bits.  The larger the key size, the more difficult it is to break the encryption.  Data goes through 
four steps of encryptions for several rounds, with the number of rounds increasing based upon 
the key size (FIPS 197, 2001).  In order to encrypt data using AES, it is first converted to a 128-
bit hexadecimal format and then processed into a 4x4 square format, where each block represents 
one byte of data.  The process then goes through multiple rounds, where the number depends 
upon the key size.  The first step is to add a round key, and then the data goes through four steps 
(NIST, 2001): 
1. SubBytes 
2. ShiftRows 
3. MixColumns 
4. AddRoundKey 
This process repeats for ten, twelve, or fourteen rounds, depending on whether they key size is 
128, 192, or 256, respectively.  The process begins by substituting bytes according to pre-defined 
substitution table (SubByes), and then proceeds through steps of shifting rows (ShiftRows), 
mixing columns(MixColumns), and adding a round key(AddRoundKey).  Each round serves to 
scramble the data further.   
 AES is considered more secure than other forms of encryption, although there have been 
indications that it can potentially can be attacked by solving algebraic equations that are the heart 
of its predefined tables (Courtois & Pieprzyk, 2002).  However, it remains the US government 
standard for encryption and is widely-used in private industry as well.   
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2.2.2 Asymmetric encryption 
 The other category of encryption is asymmetric encryption, which is commonly known as 
public key encryption.  In asymmetric encryption, there is a pair of keys that are used to encrypt 
and decrypt information.  One key is public and can be made freely available, while the private 
key is held by a user.  This method of encryption allows users to send a message and authenticate 
that it comes from a valid source.  This protects the keys from accidental exposure while being 
transmitted over the internet, since the private key never has to be transmitted.   
Common forms of asymmetric encryption include the Diffie-Hellman method of key 
exchange; the Rivert, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA) algorithm for encryption; and the Digital 
Signature Algorithm (DSA), which is the United States Federal Information Processing Standard 
(FIPS) for digital signatures.  Diffie-Hellman allows two users to securely exchange a secret key 
over an insecure network, and is used in the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol (Ciampa, 2005).  RSA 
is commonly used in operating systems and secure communications, including Secure Sockets 
Layer and (SSL) Transport Layer Security (TLS).  Finally, a digital signature is included in a 
message in order to verify the authenticity of the sender.  A digital signature must be 
unforgettable, authentic, unalterable, and non-reusable in order to be effective (Pfleeger & 
Pfleeger, 2007).  This frequently makes use of a trusted third party, known as a certificate 
authority (CA), to verify the authenticity of the signature.   
2.3 Remote Access Methods 
No remote access solution is completely free from risk.  It’s important to bear this in 
mind and perform careful risk analysis when looking at the various methods of remote access.  
The National Institute of Standards and Technology outlines four common methods of remote 
access (Scarfone, Hoffman, and Souppaya, 2009): 
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1. Tunneling 
2. Application Portals 
3. Remote Desktop Access 
4. Direct Application Access  
Tunneling typically involves a client-based virtual private network (VPN), while application 
portals are typically web-based.  Remote desktop access encompasses MobiKEY as well as 
solutions such as GoToMyPC and desktop virtualization.  The fourth option, direct application 
access specifically allows access to a particular application, such as email.  As this final method 
allows more limited access than the other options, it is not addressed further due to the scope of 
this paper.   
2.3.1 Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) 
 One of the more common methods of remote access is via VPN.  A VPN allows a remote 
user to establish a secured tunnel between their computer or network device back to an 
organization’s network.  This allows the user to access network resources through this 
connection.  There are typically two types of VPNs: Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) VPN and 
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) VPN (Scarfone and Souppaya, 2007).  An IPSec VPN uses client 
software that is installed on the user’s PC, while an SSL VPN more typically utilizes a web-
based connection.  Utilizing VPN for remote access is common today, but these solutions are not 
perfect from a security standpoint.  NTA Monitor performed a three year study of VPNs that 
found a number of common vulnerabilities across vendors, including VPN fingerprinting, which 
allows an attacker to identify the device or software version; insecure storage of login credentials 
by VPN clients; username enumeration vulnerabilities, which allows attackers to obtain valid 
usernames; and poor default configurations (Hills, 2005).  While these findings apply to client-
based IPSec VPNs, SSL VPNs have their own vulnerabilities.  For example, the United States 
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Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) issued a vulnerability note in 2009 stating 
that clientless VPN products from several vendors, including Cisco, Citrix, Juniper, Microsoft, 
Nortel, and others operate in a way that breaks web browser security mechanisms (Warren & 
Giobbi, 2009).   
2.3.2 Remote Desktop Access 
 Remote desktop options for remote access may take several forms, from MobiKEY to 
solutions such as GoToMyPC.com, Laplink Everywhere, and desktop virtualization solutions.  
The specifics of MobiKEY will be addressed in detail in chapter 4.  It’s also important to 
understand remote desktop alternatives to place MobiKEY in the proper context.  Remote 
desktop solutions may be either hosted or may be managed internally.   
 GoToMyPC is a hosted service from Citrix Online that allows remote access to desktop 
resources from any remote computer using a web browser.  The service requires users to register 
the host PC with GoToMyPC.  This process installs a small server on the host that registers it 
with the GoToMyPC broker in Citrix Online’s data center.  Once this is established, users can 
log in to GoToMyPC.com using any web browser and initiate a log-in with their username and 
password.  The broker receives the request and initiates an SSL-encrypted session to the host PC.  
The remote desktop session is then passed through a communication server that is also located at 
Citrix Online’s headquarters.  These connections occur over TCP ports 80, 443, and/or 8200 
using 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (Phifer, 2010).  Port 80 is commonly used 
for Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), while port 443 is typically used for Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol over SSL/TLS (HTTPS) and is more secure.  Port 8200 is not an industry standard, but 
is specifically used for the GoToMyPC solution.   
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 Laplink Everywhere is a solution similar to GoToMyPC and is offered by Laplink.  
According to the company’s website at http://www.laplink.com/le5, this solution offers three 
ways of accessing a user’s PC remotely: via a toolbar that can be installed on a remote computer 
and allows searching and accessing files on the work PC; via any PC’s web browser by logging 
into their website at lle5.ll2go.com; or via any smart phone with a web browser.  Like 
GoToMyPC, all connections are brokered through hosted servers at Laplink’s facility using 128-
bit AES encryption.  The product utilizes Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), which is a 
standard protocol for remote desktop access in Microsoft terminal servers.  Also with Laplink 
Everywhere, the user can create guest access accounts for sharing and can easily transfer files 
from the work PC to the client PC.  The website’s demo of the product also indicates that all 
signs of the remote session are erased from the client PC once the session is ended.   
 Desktop virtualization involves solutions where PCs access an image that resides on a 
central server.  This is a form of thin-client computing, where the client PCs access applications 
that are running on a server that is located elsewhere.  There are a number of vendors who offer 
these types of solutions, including Microsoft, Citrix, and VMware.  From a security standpoint, 
this may seem more secure than other solutions because everything resides at a central location.  
However, there may be a lot of unknowns because attackers have not yet begun to target these 
solutions (Cummings, 2008).  These solutions are more typically managed internally, as opposed 
to the hosted solutions offered by vendors such as Route1, Citrix Online, and Laplink.   
 Now that there is some context for understanding remote desktop solutions, the author 
will turn to an analysis of MobiKEY in the next chapters.   
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Chapter 3 – Methodology 
 This project examined the security advantages of utilizing MobiKEY for remote access 
utilizing the risk assessment portion of the risk management methodology.  As defined by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), there are nine steps to the risk 
assessment process (Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa, 2002).  These steps are: 
1. System Characterization 
2. Threat Identification 
3. Vulnerability Identification 
4. Control Analysis 
5. Likelihood Determination 
6. Impact Analysis 
7. Risk Determination 
8. Control Recommendations 
9. Results Documentation 
Each of these steps plays an important role in determining the risk level of the solution and 
whether deploying the solution is within the realm of acceptable risk. See figure 3.1 for an 
overview of the process.  Following is an explanation of what is entailed in each step of the 
process. 
 Security Assessment of MobiKEY 
12 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Risk Assessment Methodology 
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3.1 System Characterization 
System characterization involves outlining the components that make up the environment of 
the system.  This involves gathering data about all elements that make up this environment, 
including: 
 Hardware 
 Software 
 System Interfaces, which are used to connect to the system 
 Data and information 
 People who support and use the system 
 System mission or how the system is functionally utilized. 
This data is used to develop an understanding of all involved systems and the general design of 
the operating environment. 
 
3.2 Threat Identification 
This step involves identifying any threats that may be able to exploit vulnerabilities in the 
environment.  Threats may come from any number of sources, and may be either deliberate or 
accidental.  A threat in computing terms means something that can potentially cause loss or harm 
(Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007).  Threats may be posed by individuals both inside and outside of an 
organization, or by computers themselves, such as when there are software or hardware failures.  
Threats can also be posed by environmental factors or natural disasters.  The end result of threat 
identification is to compile a list of potential threats that may cause harm to the system. 
 
3.3 Vulnerability Identification 
The goal of this step is to compile a list of vulnerabilities that could be exploited by a threat.  
A vulnerability is defined as “a flaw or weakness in the system security procedures, design, 
implementation, or internal controls that could be exercised (accidentally triggered or 
intentionally exploited) and result in a security breach or violation of the system’s security 
policy” (Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa, 2002).   
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3.4 Control Analysis 
During this step, the goal is to identify any controls that are in place within the system 
environment.  Controls are used to decrease the chance that a system vulnerability will be 
exploited.  They can also be used to minimize the impact if such an event occurs. 
3.5 Likelihood Determination 
As the header suggests, this step involves identifying how likely it is that a particular 
vulnerability may be exploited and cause harm to the system.  The likelihood may be high, 
medium, or low.   
 3.6 Impact Analysis  
 This step involves determining how much of an impact the exploitation of a vulnerability 
will have on an IT system’s mission.  Any loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
data must be considered in terms of the impact that this will have.   
3.7 Risk Determination 
This step is designed to determine the risk level, which is defined as high, medium, or 
low.  The risk level is determined from the likelihood that a threat will be exploited; the level of 
impact to the organization if a breach occurs; and the effectiveness of any planned or current 
controls in mitigating the risks of any security breach.   
3.8 Control Recommendations 
After completing all of the other steps, the result is a recommendation of controls that 
should be put in place in order to mitigate the risks posed by the likelihood of a vulnerability 
being exploited.   
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3.9 Results Documentation 
This final step involves creating a risk assessment report from the data gathered during 
the previous eight steps.  In this case, this document will be the end result.   
3.10 Methods of Information Collection and Sources 
 In researching this project, the author has utilized multiple sources of information.  The 
sources include information security books, web articles, journals, and vendor-specific sources of 
information.  This provided a good background, as well as an understanding of the advantages 
and disadvantages of different options.  However, the best way to determine the security 
advantages of MobiKEY is by first-hand testing.  The author obtained a MobiKEY, along with a 
30-day trial to TruOFFICE, from Route1 for testing purposes.   
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Chapter 4 – MobiKEY Analysis 
 The MobiKEY from Route1 offers an alternative to other forms of remote access, such as 
VPN connectivity and remote desktop solutions, such as GoToMyPC.  The primary question is 
whether MobiKEY is a better alternative from a security standpoint.   
4.1 MobiKEY: How it works 
MobiKEY is a small device that connects to the USB port of any computer.  MobiKEY 
works in conjunction with MobiNET.  MobiNET is a hosted identity management solution that 
authenticates users and allows them to access resources that they are authorized to use.  
MobiKEY must be registered with MobiNET, configured and setup before users can access 
resources with the device.  This entire process is typically completed in a matter of minutes and 
without any reconfigurations to the PC or any firewalls.   
 First, the MobiNET Agent software is installed the host computer.  This software issues 
digital X.509 certificates to identify the users and what resources they are authorized to access.  
The MobiNET Agent software must be installed on all resources that are going to be accessed 
using the MobiKEY.  Once this has been configured, the user can use the MobiKEY to access 
resources remotely. 
 The MobiKEY device can be plugged into a USB port of any internet-connected 
computer.  The computer can be anywhere, as long as there is a wired or wireless internet 
connection.  Once the MobiKEY is connected to the computer, the user is prompted to enter their 
MobiNET password.  There is a smartcard built into the MobiKEY that authenticates the user’s 
password with MobiNET’s certificate authority.  Once this is done, the user is presented with a 
list of resources that he or she is authorized to access.  These resources are all hosts that have 
been configured with the MobiNET Agent.  A user can be authorized to access multiple 
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resources, not just their own work computer.  These resources need to be predefined within 
MobiNET.  The user does this by connecting the MobiKEY to a computer and configuring it as a 
host.  Once the user selects a resource with which to connect, the MobiKEY sends this request to 
MobiNET.  MobiNET then initiates the connection back to the MobiNET Agent on the host.  
The Agent initiates a secured SSL connection with the MobiKEY.  This connection runs entirely 
on the MobiKEY without placing any files or leaving any trace on the client computer that is 
used to connect.  See figure 4.1, taken from the Route1 website, for a depiction of this entire 
process. 
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Figure 4.1: The MobiKEY connection process 
 
The communications between the host and MobiNET, as well as the MobiKEY and 
MobiNET, all occurs over port 443.  As previously noted, port 443 is used for Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) and is used for secure transactions.  The use of this port 
allows MobiKEY to be used without any reconfigurations to corporate firewalls, since this port 
is commonly used for highly secure web transactions, such as financial transactions.   Many 
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other applications require firewall reconfigurations to allow them to punch through for 
communications, but this is not the case with MobiKEY.   
TruOFFICE is the solution offered by Route1 that allows remote control of the work 
desktop.  The MobiKEY allows the user to launch the TruOFFICE session and the user then 
accesses the work PC from the client, with everything remaining behind the corporate firewall 
and no file transfer allowed between the work computer and the client.  All keystrokes that are 
sent to the work computer are encrypted, and all screen changes that are sent from the work 
computer to the MobiKEY are also encrypted.   
4.1.1 Necessary components for MobiKEY deployment 
 MobiKEY simplifies the components needed for remote access.  Users still have work 
computers, but it is not necessary that this be a laptop that the user takes with them when leaving 
the office.  The work computer has the MobiNET agent installed and be accessed from 
anywhere.  In order for this to work, the work computer must remain on.  This increases the 
importance of physical security.  Control to the physical premises where the computer is stored 
must be maintained in order to prevent unauthorized access.  The user must make sure to lock the 
computer when not in the office; this is also good security practice even when in the office but 
away from the computer.  Locking the computer also mitigates risk by requiring an attacker to 
possess local login credentials in order to access any protected information.   
 Additionally, steps should be taken on the work computer to harden it against security 
threats.  There are several steps that can be taken to achieve this, including installing anti-virus 
software; installing a personal firewall; utilizing encryption for critical files; and shutting down 
any unnecessary services on the laptop.  The work computer should also be patched with any 
operating system and application software updates and patches that are available to address any 
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known vulnerabilities.  These are all good practice for general security and aren’t specifically 
needed because of MobiKEY.  However, it is important to address them in all cases to protect 
the computer from threats.   
Along these same lines, it’s critical that if this is a computer that is part of an 
organization’s trusted network that proper steps be taken to protect the network.  This should 
include the user of a corporate firewall that is properly configured.  It may also involve the user 
of a demilitarized zone (DMZ), which adds an additional layer of security between the open 
Internet and trusted internal resources.  The internal network should always have proper security 
mechanisms in place to protect it, regardless of the remote access solution that is being used.   
 Since the computer needs to remain on and have an internet connection in order to be 
accessed via MobiKEY, it’s also important that the site where the resources are kept has 
provisions for backup power and disaster recovery.  Again, this should also be part of planning 
for any remote security option, but it becomes more critical with MobiKEY.  No resources ever 
leave the company’s premises, so they must remain in service or the remote user is completely 
cut off.   
4.1.2 Additional Features of MobiKEY 
 MobiKEY offers several security features that make it an attractive remote access option.  
First, MobiKEY offers two-factor authentication (2FA.)  In order to access the remote resources, 
the user must both possess the MobiKEY device and know the correct password in order to 
authenticate with MobiNET.  This is 2FA based upon what the user has and what the user 
knows.  Only when possessing both is the user able to access any resources.  This offers a 
stronger form of authentication than simply accessing with one of the methods.  This stands in 
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contrast to web-based remote access options such as GoToMyPC or an SSL VPN portal that 
depend only upon one factor (username/password.)   
 Additionally, MobiKEY runs entirely off the USB token and is completely clientless and 
driverless.  No trace of the user session is left on the client computer that is used to access 
internal network resources.  This simplifies the need to secure the client computer and protects 
the internal network from accidental exposure to threats.  Since the session is running off of the 
MobiKEY token, there is no need to take extraordinary security measures to protect the client 
before connecting.  The client computer may be the user’s home PC or even a PC in an internet 
café.  The session is not impacted by any viruses, malware, or key loggers that may be running 
on the client PC, because it’s all running on the MobiKEY token itself.  This protects the trusted 
network from being exposed to any of these threats via the remote access session.   
4.2 MobiKEY Threat Identification 
Any remote session that involves accessing private or confidential information across the 
Internet is open to some form of threat.  It’s important to understand the types of attackers and 
attacks that such a solution may face before deployment.  In the case of MobiKEY, many of 
these are not as much of a threat as they are when deploying other forms of remote access. 
4.2.1 Types of Attackers 
There are a number of types of individuals who may attack computer systems.  These 
include hackers, crackers, disgruntled or dishonest employees, terrorists, or spies (Ciampa, 
2005).  It’s important to distinguish among the various types to understand the threat that they 
pose. 
A hacker is someone who accesses computer systems for relatively benign reasons.  A 
hacker will attempt to access a system without authorization just to prove that he or she can do it.  
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Closely related to the hacker is the cracker, who is someone who accesses systems without 
authorization with the intention to do harm.   In the mainstream media, the term hacker is often 
used to describe both.   In computer security, it’s important to understand the distinction.  The 
hacker without bad intentions may also be called a white hat, while the cracker is commonly 
referred to as a black hat.  However, both hackers and crackers are attempting to access resources 
and systems without authorization, so both pose a security risk.  The ethical implications of both 
are the same; regardless of motivation, someone is accessing resources without the authorization 
to do so and should be considered a potential threat.   
Employees can also be attackers, and are one of the more dangerous forms of attacker.  If 
an employee wishes to do harm for some reason, whether it’s because they are disgruntled or are 
interested in some form of financial or personal gain, then it is difficult to stop them.  The 
employee has the advantage of being a trusted resource with authorized access.   
Terrorists are also an increasingly common form of attacker.  Terrorists may attempt to 
utilize computers as targets or methods of attack, as well as to spread propaganda (Pfleeger & 
Pfleeger, 2007). Terrorists may seek to deface websites or deny resources to legitimate users in 
order to further their cause. 
 Finally, spies are another common form of attacker.  Spies are out to obtain information 
without being detected.   
 Any attacker needs method, opportunity, and motive to launch an attack on a system 
(Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007.)  From the standpoint of computer security, it’s easier to address 
solutions to deny the effectiveness of methods or opportunities to launch an attack.   
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4.2.2 Common Attacks 
 There are a number of common attacks that may target a remote access user.  Among 
these are man-in-the-middle attacks; malicious code or malware; password guessing; and social 
engineering.  Each of these is examined in turn. 
 A man-in-the-middle attack involves eavesdropping on a connection between two 
endpoints.  This may commonly be performed with a packet capture device that records traffic to 
and from a particular IP address.  The traffic captured may be saved and replayed later, or it may 
be intercepted and altered before being sent on to the final destination.  In any case, the 
confidentiality and integrity of the data is compromised.   
 Malicious code, or malware, is software that is installed on a user’s machine without the 
user’s permission.  There are a number of types of malware, including viruses, worms, logic 
bombs, Trojan horses, and backdoors (Ciampa, 2005).  A virus is software that causes disruption 
when a program is run or an email attachment is downloaded.  The virus infects the computer 
when this is done and then attempts to spread to other computers.  A worm is a similar type of 
attack, but it propagates itself to other users and doesn’t usually require action by the user in 
order to spread.   A logic bomb is a type of malware that will launch with a triggering event, such 
as when a specific date/time is reached.  Trojan horses are programs that are downloaded and 
appear to be innocuous, such as a screensaver.  However, Trojan horses hide some other software 
with malicious intent.  Lastly, a backdoor program is one that allows users to enter a system 
without the owner’s knowledge or consent.   
 Password guessing is form of attack in which an unauthorized user attempts to access a 
system with another’s credentials.  Such attacks may take the form of a dictionary attack, where 
the attacker attempts passwords based upon words in the dictionary, or a brute force attack, 
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where the attack attempts to guess any password based upon the password guidelines.  If an 
attacker is able to obtain the user’s username and password, the attacker can then access any 
resources that the authorized user can.  They can steal, destroy, or alter any data that the user can 
access. 
 Social engineering is a type of attack where the user tricks an unauthorized user into 
providing access.  The attacker does this by posing as someone who should have access or by 
convincing an authorized user to provide information that allows them to have such access.  This 
can involve gaining physical access or obtaining passwords in order to access remote systems.   
4.3 Vulnerability Identification 
Once the potential threats are recognized, it’s important to identify any vulnerabilities 
that may exist within the systems and solution.  A vulnerability is a flaw within a solution that 
may be exploited by an attacker.  Such a flaw may exist in the design, implementation, or in 
security procedures.  Vulnerabilities can be identified from previous risk assessments, running 
automated scanning tools, or by reviewing security white papers. 
For a remote access solution, vulnerabilities may exist in the equipment used to access 
the secure network remotely; within the secure network, where access from the outside may be 
exploited; or by actions taken by the trusted employee who is attempting to access resources 
remotely.  The latter is the greatest risk.  If an employee is careless, then it’s possible that 
attackers may be able to gain access to any equipment that is taken out of the office by the 
employee.  For example, an employee may take a company laptop or a USB drive and these may 
be stolen.  If the data on these is not encrypted, then an attacker can very easily compromise 
confidential data.   
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With MobiKEY, the user only has to take the MobiKEY device offsite.  If this device is 
lost or stolen, it can be deactivated by the administrator so that it becomes inoperable, per 
information from Route1’s website.  An expedited replacement can then be supplied by Route1.  
While there is some risk if an unauthorized user has access to both the password and the 
MobiKEY for some period of time, this risk is much less than if a device that actually contains 
files is lost or stolen.  Additionally, the attacker must also have login credentials to the host 
machine.  This actually requires the unauthorized users to possess three factors in order to 
compromise trusted resources.  This makes the potential vulnerability from using MobiKEY 
much less likely than other solutions.   
In other ways, MobiKEY also seems to be less vulnerable than other remote access 
solutions, such as GoToMyPC or Laplink Everywhere.  These services work in a very similar 
manner to MobiKEY, but work from a web browser.  The remote user does not have to possess 
any device, but simply can log in from any computer with web access.  However, since the 
session is initiated from the remote PC, the security of the remote PC is more of an issue than 
with MobiKEY, where the session is initiated from the device.  It’s possible that the remote PC 
may have keylogging software, which captures all key strokes made by the user, or may be 
compromised by not having firewall or anti-virus protection.  Additionally, web browsers are 
still subjected to many attacks.  In SANS’s top cyber security risks in September 2009, the 
organization identified browsers and client-side applications that are launched from browsers as 
among the most commonly targeted by attackers (SANS, 2009.)   
While considering multiple remote access methods, MobiKEY appears to have less 
exploitable vulnerability than other options that are currently available.  This gives the 
MobiKEY option an advantage over other remote access methods.  
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4.4 Control Analysis 
Control analysis involves examining any current or planned controls to guard against 
security risks.  In the case of MobiKEY, there are many controls offered.  As already noted, 
MobiKEY utilizes 2FA based upon something the user has (the MobiKEY) and something that 
the user knows (the accompanying password.)  Without possession of both, an unauthorized user 
cannot gain access to the internal network.  However, there are also a number of other controls 
offered by the solution.  Among these controls are:  a public key infrastructure (PKI) and 
integrated smart card to provide secure authentication and connection, and a highly secure SSL 
connection to protect data that is transferred during the remote access session.  
MobiNET offers a PKI infrastructure that handles all access, authentication, and 
authorization for users.  Certificates are issued by MobiNET for the MobiKEY and any hosts 
running MobiNET Agent, and the MobiNET manages the identities of all components.  
MobiNET also manages what users are authorized to access via a particular MobiKEY device.  If 
the device is lost or stolen, then the PKI can be used to revoke the certificates, as described in the 
previous section.  This is more a more secure method of identifying and authenticating users than 
by using passwords alone.  Additionally, the integrated smart card on the MobiKEY is used to 
store the certificate and connection information in an encrypted format.  This protects the 
information from attackers, even in the event that they obtain the MobiKEY device.  These items 
serve to provide the user with a secure way to authenticate and prevent attackers from even 
accessing any secure resources. 
Additionally, data is protected during transit by creating a highly secure client-server SSL 
conversation between the MobiKEY and the host.  These communications occur over SSL port 
443, and all communication is encrypted.  Any keystrokes from the client with MobiKEY are 
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encrypted, as is the screen presentation from the host running MobiNET Agent.  Since the user is 
actually working off the host PC, all information stays behind the corporate firewall and there is 
no opportunity for man-in-the-middle attacks.   
 According to Route1’s website, there are a number of other security advantages offered 
by MobiKEY and MobiNET.  These include: 
 Smart Card, Common Criteria EAL4+ certified 
 Private key never leaves the smart card 
 1024 to 4096-bit asymmetric keys 
 FIPS 140-2 
 TLS 1.0 (SSL 3.1) 
 128-bit/256-bit AES  
 RSA/SHA-1/SHA-2 signing algorithm 
 Evaluated by ICSA labs. 
This information was obtained from an information sheet at Route1’s website 
(http://www.route1.com/mobinet/documents/Route1_Security.pdf), and it’s worth discussing a 
few of these items in more detail to clarify their meaning.  The following paragraphs elaborate 
on Common Criteria and FIPS 140-2.   
 Common Criteria certified refers to an international standard for computer security 
certification.   Common Criteria security evaluation is specified in International Organization for 
Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) 15408. (Common Criteria, 
2009)  Products go through an evaluation process and are assigned one of seven Evaluation 
Assurance Levels (EALs).  This credential indicates that the MobiKEY product went through 
this testing process. 
 Security Assessment of MobiKEY 
28 
 
 FIPS 140-2 refers to Federal Information Processing Standard 140-2, which is a standard 
published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.  This document, first published 
as FIPS 140-1 in 1994 and updated to FIPS 140-2, defines standards for the design and 
implementation of a cryptographic module (FIPS 140-2, 2001).  This standard defines four 
levels, numbered one through four.  Level one is the lowest level while level four is the highest.  
Route1 achieved level 1 FIPS 140-2 certification for their cryptographic module on July 17, 
2008 (NIST, 2008).   
 The security controls offered by MobiKEY and MobiNET are used by Route1 as one of 
the biggest selling points for the product.  Based upon the information available, the 
authentication and encryption features offered by Route1 do provide strong protection against 
any attacks.    
4.5 Likelihood Determination 
Based upon the analysis to this point, it seems unlikely that remote access via MobiKEY 
will result in a security breach.  As noted previously, an attacker would need to gain access to 
both the MobiKEY device and the user’s password in order to use it to gain access to the internal 
network.  This would require careless behavior on the part of the user, or compliance on the part 
of the user in such an attack.  In the case of the former, the device can quickly be deactivated by 
contacting Route1 and having the MobiKEY’s security certificate revoked.  This can be 
prevented by educating users about the importance of keeping passwords secure, as well of the 
importance of immediately reporting if the device is lost or stolen.  In the latter case, it is very 
difficult to defend against an attack by a trusted user.  In this event, MobiKEY would not seem to 
provide significant advantages over other forms of remote access.   
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 Additionally, the security provided by the SSL session between the host computer and the 
MobiKEY makes it unlikely that the session will be compromised by man-in-the-middle attacks 
or any vulnerabilities on the machine used for remote access.  Most of the most common attacks 
are circumvented by the authentication and connection process.   
 By comparison, other remote access solutions seem more likely to fall victim to 
exploitation.  Any remote access solution that involves taking resources out of the workplace is 
exposed to physical loss, whether by accident or intentional theft.  A device that is used to access 
the network via an IPSec or SSL VPN may not be properly protected from viruses, malware, and 
threats, and may expose the internal trusted network to these threats.  Overall, the information 
obtained by the author indicates that the likelihood of a security breach with MobiKEY is much 
lower than other alternatives.   
4.6 Impact Analysis 
Any security breach that occurs as a result of a remote access solution has the potential to 
compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical information.  The impact of 
any such breach depends upon the value of the information to the organization.  All data has 
value, but some data has more value than others.  This depends upon the nature of the business 
and how critical the information is to that business.  The impact can range from losing advantage 
because a competitor has access to sensitive information, to facing legal and civil penalties if the 
data compromised is protected by a law such as the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA).  In order to determine the impact, a careful analysis must be 
performed to determine the criticality and sensitivity of the data, as well as any associated 
systems.  This step must occur independently of the remote access solution chosen, although the 
results will be considered along with other factors in the next step of the risk assessment process.  
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4.7 Risk Determination 
The risk determination stage involves determining the risks and levels of risk associated 
with a solution.  In determining the risk, any organization should consider the likelihood of threat 
exploitation, the magnitude of impact, and the adequacy of any controls.  In the case of 
MobiKEY, the likelihood of threat exploitation is low while the adequacy of controls is high.  As 
explained in section 4.2 and 4.3, there are few threats that seem likely to successfully exploit any 
vulnerabilities in the product.  Likewise, the controls provided make it unlikely that any attacker 
can successfully compromise any data unless they can obtain the MobiKEY device, the 
corresponding password, and have the loss of the MobiKEY go unreported for some time.  While 
no solution is ever full-proof, MobiKEY does stand at an advantage versus other remote access 
solutions.  
4.8 Control Recommendations 
The MobiKEY itself, used in conjunction with TruOFFICE, provides strong controls to 
prevent any attacks.  This allows all data to remain inside the trusted network and within the 
confines of the workplace.  Depending on the nature of the data, it may also be advisable to 
block local printing and utilize AES-256 for all TruOFFICE connections.  The simplicity of this 
solution stands in stark contract when compared to SSL VPN or other web-based remote access 
solutions.   
4.9 Results Documentation 
As noted previously, this document is the results documentation for this risk assessment 
of MobiKEY.  If this were being performed for a specific organization, then the results would be 
documented and kept as part of the organization’s security policy.  This risk assessment may also 
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be reviewed periodically in order to maintain security policy and ensure that the risk does not 
change over time.   
After performing this overview of the solution, the next step was to obtain the MobiKEY 
and perform product testing to validate its security advantages.  The testing of the product was 
not as easy as expected, but did provide the author with enough information to draw conclusions.   
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Chapter 5 – Analysis and Results: MobiKEY testing 
The author determined that the best way to evaluate the security aspects of MobiKEY 
was to test it.  It was relatively simple to obtain the device for testing.  Route1’s website instructs 
visitor’s to contact the company directly via telephone at +1-416-848-8391.  The author 
contacted Route1 at this number and was connected to a sales representative, Neville Thomas.  
Neville advised that the MobiKEY can be obtained for a fee of $175 plus shipping, along with a 
30 day trial of TruOFFICE.  The sales representative also advised that if the author chose to 
continue with TruOFFICE past the 30 day trial, the cost would be $300 for one year.  Once the 
author advised that he wished to proceed with the purchase for testing purposes, the sales 
representative emailed a contract that required the author to provide shipping and payment 
information, along with a valid signature.  This contract can be viewed in appendix A.  The 
MobiKEY was received by the author on the following day, so it only took a period of 24 hours 
to purchase and have the device in hand. 
5.1 MobiKEY host installation 
During the research process, the author found multiple sources, including Breeden 
(Breeden, 2006) and Marsan (Marsan, 2009), who indicated how easy the installation and setup 
process for MobiKEY is to perform.  The author installed the MobiKEY on a Hewlett Packard 
model HP Pavilion DV7 laptop.  Unfortunately, this process was not entirely seamless, and this 
appeared to be related to issues with the test computer.  Upon inserting the MobiKEY in an 
available USB port, the author was presented with a window with an error message, “HID 
DATA has stopped working” (see figure 5.1.) 
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Figure 5.1  Error message from Windows Vista on test machine 
Despite this error, the MobiKEY installation was able to proceed normally.  Further 
complications were encountered after installion, but that will be addressed later.  For screen shots 
of the installation process, please see appendix B.  Upon insertion into the USB port, the 
executable file on the device ran and the user was prompted with a window requesting that the 
user enter the license key, which is provided by Route1 along with the MobiKEY device.   
 After entering the license key, the user hits the “Next” button in the window provided and 
moves to a window where the MobiNET password must be created.  The MobiNET password 
must be between 8 and 16 characters in length.  The user must enter the password twice, and a 
warning in the window notes that during login, the user has a limited number of times to enter 
the password before the MobiKEY is locked.   
The window following password creation prompts the user to create a security 
question/answer pair that can be used to verify a user’s identity.  Unlike many websites that 
provide a list of standard questions, Route1 allows the user to create their own question and 
answer.  This is yet another way that the product is more secure than other options.   
Once the question and answer pair is entered, the user clicks the “Next” button and then 
must wait a few seconds while the information is transmitted to MobiNET.  Once that is 
complete, the user is prompted to enter their information.  Finally, once this is completed, the 
 Security Assessment of MobiKEY 
34 
 
user is provided with a window displaying the user id and providing prompting to add a host to 
access using the MobiKEY.   
In order to add a host, the user clicks continue and is prompted to add either this 
computer or another remote host.  In the case of the author’s testing, the existing computer was 
used.  The next step is to install the MobiNET host software on the computer.  The MobiNET 
host software is installed via an Install Shield wizard that launches separately.  The user is 
provided with the license agreement, which must be accepted in order to complete installation.  
The next step is to specify where the program will be installed (or accept the default location).  
Once these steps are completed, the MobiNET host software is installed and the user can then 
exit the wizard to return to the MobiKEY wizard.   
The user is prompted to enter the host name so that the resource can be identified when 
initiating a remote session.  In this case, the author chose the host name “Joe-Host PC” since this 
describes the resource that was used for testing purposes.  After this is done, the program advises 
that the host was successfully added and prompts the user to reboot the PC to complete 
installation. 
In the author’s testing environment, the post-installation required significant issues.  
Windows Vista failed to restart on the test PC, and the author launched Windows recovery to get 
the PC back into an operational state.  Ultimately, the author had to restore to an earlier state that 
wiped out the installation of MobiKEY and MobiNET agent.  Upon inserting the MobiKEY into 
a USB port after recovery, the author was again prompted with an error from the machine 
indicating “HID DATA has stopped working.”  A Google search of technical support forums 
found that this issue relates to a program on the laptop for HP Quick Launch Buttons. The author 
took two actions in an attempt to remedy the situation.  First, this error message seems to be 
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commonly associated with installing a blue tooth mouse on HP laptops running Windows Vista.  
At the support forum located at URL http://forums.techarena.in/vista-hardware-
devices/1023595.htm, the author found a recommendation to move several dynamic link library 
(DLL) files that related the HP Quick Launch Button program (see figure 5.2).  Additionally, a 
search of the manufacturer website led the author to 
http://h10025.www1.hp.com/ewfrf/wc/document?docname=c01712518&cc=us&lc=en&dlc=en, 
where the user followed instructions to download a new version of the HP Quick Launch Button 
software.  These two actions allowed the author to restore the test host to a functional state in 
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here is the solution to your problem 
 
I was having the same problem with my bluetooth microsoft wireless notebook presenter 
mouse 8000. The problem is created by an application in the HP quick launch Buttons. I 
removed the application from the launch buttons. 
 
go to: 
 
C:\Program Files\Hewlett-Packard\HP Quick Launch Buttons 
 
move the following files to a backup folder on your computer: 
 
HidActn.dll 
Hiddata 
PushHid.dll 
 
Then restart you computer and you should not have the errors and the other things on your 
laptop should still be available. 
Figure 5.2  Solution recommendation for test PC  
 
order to test the MobiKEY.  However, this state only lasted until the host machine was rebooted 
once again.  Upon the next reboot of the PC, the system received a Windows Blue Screen and 
would not boot.  The system rebooted and went into system recovery once again, where the 
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solution was to restore the PC to an earlier state.  At this point, MobiNET agent would no longer 
function, and any attempt to access the MobiKEY from a remote PC would show the host as 
being offline.  The author made several attempts to reinstall the MobiNET agent software, but 
the results were the same.  Ultimately, this only allowed the author to make one successful test 
session of the MobiKEY.  All indications are that the issues encountered are specific to the test 
machine, and the author did not perform an exhaustive attempt to make this work again.  For 
example, the author considered reloading the test PC or upgrading to a newer operating system, 
Windows 7.  However, limitations of time due to the author’s commitments professionally and to 
a deadline for this project made both of these options improbable. The author was also limited to 
testing MobiKEY with his personal PC, as this was the only machine to which he had access.  
While the author did have access to another computer that is provided by his employer, the 
employer’s security policy specifically prohibited him from installing the MobiNET agent 
software on that machine as a host.    The author performed a follow-up with Route1 about two 
months after testing the solution.  The original contact, Neville Thomas, was no longer with the 
organization, so the follow-up was conducted with Tanieu Tan, Vice President of Marketing and 
Communication.  Ms. Tan indicated that the author could have sought assistance from the 
Route1 technical support team for the installation issues.  The author’s own background with 
computers and technical support made him decide not to do this initially.  Ultimately, the author 
also determined that the initial test session provided adequate information to test the security 
aspects of MobiKEY, so the PC-specific issues did not hinder the analysis.    
5.2 Remote Session Using MobiKEY 
Once the test machine had MobiNET agent installed and was functional, the next step 
was to test the solution by plugging the MobiKEY into another computer.  In this instance, the 
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author utilized another laptop that was temporarily connected to the same network as the host 
computer.  This laptop will subsequently be referred to as the remote computer.  Please see 
appendix C for screenshots showing the results that are discussed in the following section. 
 Upon inserting the MobiKEY into the remote computer, the author was provided with a 
login window that prompts the user to enter the MobiNET password associated with the 
MobiKEY.  Once the password was entered, the author was provided with a list of resources that 
he is authorized to access.  In this case, that was limited to the host computer.  Once the author 
clicked on the “connect” button, he was provided with a full screen window of the host 
computer.  The host computer also is administered with a login password, so the remote session 
also prompted the user to enter this password.  Once the password was entered, the user was 
presented with the desktop of the host computer.  He had the ability to open and run any 
programs or access any documents on the host PC using the remote session.  The author 
observed that this was no different than accessing the PC locally. 
 While running this session, the author also ran a packet capture on each machine using 
Wireshark, a free protocol analyzer available for download from www.wireshark.org.  This tool 
allows the user to capture traffic that is occurring in both ways from the point of capture.  On the 
remote computer, the author observed that Wireshark showed all traffic between MobiNET and 
the remote computer was in the Transport Layer Security version 1.0 (TLSv1).  The remote 
computer initiates a client hello to the MobiNET server, and the two engaged in a handshaking 
and certificate exchange process.  Next, the author observed that MobiNET initiates this same 
communication to the host computer.  Once the session is mutually authenticated, the traffic was 
exchanged between the remote and host computer IPs directly.  This information remained 
encrypted using TLS/SSL for the duration of the session.  The packet capture on the host 
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machine was consistent with what was seen on the remote computer.  As noted earlier, these 
communications all occur over port 443.   
 Additionally, the author observed that the MobiKEY session indicates that the connection 
is authenticated using AES-256.  Under the settings tab in the session window, the user can 
specify whether to use AES-256 or AES-128.  This option is located under the “TruOFFICE 
Session” tab within the settings window.  The default setting was set for the more secure AES-
256 option.   
 More security is also provided under the “Presentation” tab of the settings window.  The 
user has the option to be warned at startup if the computer has any remote access applications or 
screen capture applications running.  These are selected by default, and provide further 
protection against anyone capturing any data that is transferred during the session.   
 By default, nothing is installed or transferred to the remote computer.  There is an option 
in settings to turn on logging.  There are three levels of logging (error, info, and debug), and 
these will write data to the remote computer.  The user is warned of this before enabling logging.  
During the follow-up conversation with Tanieu Tan, the author learned that the logging feature is 
included in order for their technical support staff to diagnose any issues.  Otherwise, the session 
is disconnected and disappears when the MobiKEY is disconnected from the USB port of the 
remote computer.  There is no trace of the session left behind on the remote computer. 
 Since the author tested the machine in the same physical location, he was able to observe 
the host computer during the session.  Since this is a remote access option, the keystrokes and 
actions taken on the remote computer could be observed in real-time on the host computer. As 
indicated previously, this makes it very important that the host computer be in a secured location.  
Otherwise, someone anyone with physical access to the host would be able to observe any 
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actions taken, just as they would with any other remote desktop sharing solution.  However, the 
risks are less than if the user takes the host computer out of the work location or transfers files to 
a USB drive that can easily be lost or stolen.  Because this was the biggest security issue found 
with the product, the author mentioned this to Tanieu Tan.  Tanieu provided information 
indicating that with MobiNET Agent version 2.8.50, the host is locked by default.  This can be 
changed by the user, although obviously this is not recommended because of the increased risk it 
introduces.  See figure 5.3 for a screenshot from MobiNET Agent showing where this can be 
changed in MobiNET Agent. Unfortunately, the author was unable to test this because of the 
issues encountered on the test machine.  However, the information provided from Route1 is 
sufficient to indicate that this option provides increased protection from the standpoint of 
physical security as well.   
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Figu
re 5.3 MobiNET Agent program TruOFFICE Session options 
5.3 Observations 
 Based upon the test session that was successfully completed, the author observed that 
utilizing the MobiKEY for remote access seems to be a secure and very user-friendly method of 
remote access.  Initial setup was actually very simple, other than the system issues that were 
encountered on the test PC.  The session was secure and appeared to be no different than sitting 
directly in front of the host computer, with the exception that the host machine’s desktop 
wallpaper was not visible.  However, this likely could have been tweaked by changing the 
MobiKEY’s color settings, if the author had been able to perform additional testing.  This is a 
very minor issue, though, that had no impact on productivity or security.  Overall, the process 
was secure and effective.  
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 Despite the issues with installation, which the author recognizes as being specific to the 
PC, the author concluded that MobiKEY and TruOFFICE are a highly effective and secure 
method of remote access.  If in a position to select a remote access solution for an organization, 
the author would highly recommend it based upon the security aspects.  The fact that data never 
leaves the physical location and the trusted network helps to ensure greater security for the data 
while at rest.  At the same time, the security of Route1’s solutions helps to protect the 
information in transit and makes it nearly impossible for any intruders to compromise the session 
in progress.  The solution is innovative and secure, and offers many advantages over other forms 
of remote access.   
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Chapter 6 – Conclusions 
 The reality of today’s business world is that employees often do have a legitimate 
business need for remote access.  Employees may need to work off hours from home, or access 
work resources while traveling for business.  It may also provide advantages to companies by 
having their employees “go green” by not commuting to and from the office on certain days of 
the week.  Remote access is here to stay, but the security implications of solutions to enable this 
must be carefully considered.   
 The purpose of this project was to evaluate the security advantages of MobiKEY from 
Route1 for remote access over other remote access solutions, such as VPN solutions and other 
remote desktop solutions, such as GoToMyPC and Laplink Everywhere.  Based upon an analysis 
of existing literature and first-hand testing of the MobiKEY device, the author concludes that this 
product does indeed offer many significant advantages over other remote access solutions.  The 
risks of using the MobiKEY are lower than those of other remote solutions.  Among the key 
advantages are: two factor authentication; strong encryption of both the authentication process 
and the remote session; and physical security.  Based upon this investigation, the author 
recommends MobiKEY as a remote access solution for organizations seeking a solution with 
maximum security.   
 Two-factor authentication is one of the greatest strengths of MobiKEY.  Many remote 
desktop solutions simply depend upon a login and password in order to access resources 
remotely.  With this solution, the user must possess both the password and the MobiKEY that is 
verified against the certificate authority within MobiNET in order to access resources remotely.  
Having possession of either the password or the device only is useless, as there is no way to 
access trusted resources without both.  This is a significant advantage over browser-based 
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solutions, which only utilize one factor and are potentially susceptible to browser-based 
vulnerabilities. 
 Additionally, MobiKEY offers strong encryption.  The remote session using MobiKEY 
can be encrypted with either 128 or 256 bit AES.  Most of the other alternatives that were 
investigated would only support 128 bit AES at this time.  This level of encryption, combined 
with the use of the MobiNET to mutually authenticate the session, provides strong security.   
 Physical security is another huge advantage of the MobiKEY solution.  No files ever 
leave the company’s location, so there is no concern about lost or stolen laptops or USB sticks, 
or relying on user diligence to comply with security policies.  Additionally, MobiKEY does not 
allow file transfer, so everything truly does stay behind the corporate firewall.  The only way that 
anything leaves the trusted network is via local printer support, but even this is an option that 
may be disallowed if the administrator prefers.  By actually working off the computer that is 
behind the protected firewall, MobiKEY offers a solution that protects data both at rest and in 
transit.   
 Ideally, the author would have been able to do more testing with the MobiKEY solution, 
if it were not for issues with the test PC.  However, the testing done was significant enough to 
validate the advantages of this solution.  The available literature on similar solutions, such as 
GoToMyPC and Laplink Everywhere, was significant enough to determine the similarities and 
differences among the products.  While these other solutions do offer some similar advantages, 
Route1’s offering seems far more secure for the reasons previously specified.  
 Additionally, it may have been beneficial to do hands on testing with VPN solutions for 
more comparison, but the author did not readily have access to any such solution.  The costs and 
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logistics of testing any such solution were prohibitive of any first-hand comparison, although this 
could provide the basis for future work. 
 Overall, the information gathered allowed the author to come to the conclusion that 
MobiKEY is a more secure solution than other remote access solutions.  If placed in a position to 
select a remote access solution for an organization, the author would highly recommend 
MobiKEY for its security aspects.   
 Finally, remote access solutions seem likely to only become more prevalent in the future.  
As this occurs, new security concerns will arise and the need for strong security will increase.  
MobiKEY offers a secure solution for computer access, but their competitor, Laplink 
Everywhere, already has addressed the ability to access corporate data on smart phones.  It seems 
that this is an area where there may be increased demand in the future.  Technology is always 
evolving, and security must always be considered in order to preserve the value of information.  
When considering any new remote access solution, security must be carefully considered.  
Any breach of the confidentiality, availability, or integrity of information can have devastating 
impacts on an organization.  It’s important to balance convenience and productivity against the 
risks in order to minimize the likelihood of any such incident occurring.  Organizations must find 
a happy medium between solutions that allow everything to be wide-open and those that are 
locked down to the point of being unusable.   
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Appendix A MobiKEY sales contract 
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 Appendix B Screenshots of MobiKEY installation 
When MobiKEY is inserted, the executable file runs and you are prompted to enter the license 
key, provided by Route1 with purchase of the device. 
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After entering the product key, the user is prompted to create the MobiNET password.  This 
password must be between 8 and 16 characters in length. 
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Next the user is prompted to create a security Question/answer pair to validate identity.  Again, 
this is more secure that providing a standard question or a series of standard questions.  Route1 
allows you to create your own security question and answer.   
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Next, the user waits a few seconds while information is transmitted to MobiNET. 
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Next, the user is prompted to enter contact information on the following two screens. 
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After successful registration, the user is presented with the MobiNET user ID (obscured here for 
the author’s security) and prompted to add a host for remote access.   
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The software then prompts you to install the Host software, if this is the first time that it’s being 
registered with MobiNET. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following screens show what the user sees while installing MobiNET agent. 
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After completion of MobiNET agent installation, the user returns to the wizard to name the host. 
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Finally, the host computer must be rebooted to complete installation. 
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Appendix C Remote Access using MobiKEY 
 When plugging the MobiKEY into the remote computer, the user is prompted with a 
window requesting that he/she enter the appropriate MobiNET password. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Security Assessment of MobiKEY 
63 
 
After successful authentication, the user is prompted with a list of authorized resources. 
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If the remote host is not available, then the user will see this in the window as well. 
 
 
